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EU State aid law has sought to enable people with disabilities to obtain employment, yet
has not been explicitly included in the toolbox of policy options to improve the
availability and choice of accessible technology within the EU Internal market. This
seems to be the consequence of an inherent bias against State intervention in the
market, which is mostly unwelcome since it can limit open and free competition. This
also reiterates the ‘less-aid’ policy and the purely economic approach to State aid
professed by the European Commission. Against this background, this article
discusses the potential for EU State aid policy to foster both ‘design for all’ and
innovative assistive devices for people with disabilities. It seeks to argue that the goal
of an EU-wide market of accessible technology can be achieved using EU State aid
law. In particular, this article aims to highlight that a more targeted use of EU State
aid law can lead developers to increase the production of accessible goods, to adjust
or reduce prices and to provide consumers with a greater degree of choice in a
greater number of marketplaces. Whilst it adopts a legal approach, this analysis relies
inter alia on economic evidence and recalls the pamphlet recently published by
Mazzuccato, from which the title of this work has drawn inspiration.
Keywords: EU state aid law; accessible technology; design for all; assistive technology;
R&D
1. Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (the EU) has strongly advocated for the removal of
barriers that prevent individuals with disabilities from achieving equality of opportunity
and full participation in all aspects of life and has attempted to mainstream disability in
different areas under its competence1 (Waddington 2006, 2009, 2011a; Mabbett 2005;
Ferri 2014). The conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities (hereinafter ‘the Convention’ or the ‘UNCRPD’)2 has unequivocally supported this
mainstreaming process and has pushed the EU’s action aimed at promoting active partici-
pation of persons with disabilities in society.
In compliance with the UNCRPD, the European Disability Strategy 2010–2020 (the
‘EDS 2010–2020’ or the ‘Strategy’),3 adopted by the European Commission (hereinafter
simply the ‘Commission’) in November 2010, sets forth an ambitious policy framework
to achieve full equality of people with disabilities in Europe (Hosking 2013). It is
centred on eight interconnected thematic areas that affect (or coincide with) different EU
# 2015 Taylor & Francis
∗Email: delia.ferri@nuim.ie
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 2015
Vol. 29, Nos. 2–3, 137–161, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2015.1055660
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
9:0
6 1
3 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
competences (exclusive, shared or supporting):4 accessibility, participation, equality,
employment, education and training, social protection, health and external action.
Among these thematic areas, the Strategy marks a strong pivot in accessibility (Charitakis
2013), reflecting the importance granted to the principle of accessibility by the UNCRPD
(see Ferri, Giannoumis, and O’Sullivan 2015, Halvorsen 2009). Drawing inspiration
from Article 9 UNCRPD, the EDS 2010–2020 defines accessibility as granting people
with disabilities full access to the physical environment, transportation, information and
communications technologies and systems (ICT), and other facilities and services, and con-
ceives it as a ‘precondition for participation in society and in the economy’. This broad defi-
nition encompasses the variety of barriers that people with disabilities experience in
accessing their physical environment and participating in the market as consumers.
The Strategy acknowledges the vital role that assistive devices play in allowing persons
with disabilities to access certain goods and services and singles out, among the main goals
to achieve and enhance accessibility, the promotion of an EU-wide market of assistive tech-
nology (AT).5 The EDS 2010–2020 does not define AT; however, it seems safe to infer a
broad conceptualization of AT in line with International Standardization Organization (ISO)
and International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) Guide 71. These guidelines for stan-
dards developers address the needs of older persons and persons with disabilities (Ferri,
Giannoumis, and O’Sullivan 2015), and are in line with the definition adopted by scholars
of different disciplines (ex pluribus Abbott 2007; Scherer et al. 2007; Borg, Larsson, and
O¨stergren 2011; Ravenberg 2012; Abbott et al. 2014; Gramstad, Storli, and Hamran
2014). This broad definition would allow the Commission and, more generally, the EU leg-
islature to include any type of assistive, adaptive and rehabilitative devices aimed at com-
pensating for functional limitations, i.e. any kind of equipment, ranging from low-tech
walking devices to high tech assistive Information and Communication Technology
(ICT), including Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) solutions.6 Beside the improvement of
AT’s availability and choice, the Strategy clearly affirms the EU’s commitment to
enhance ‘Design for All’ or, as it is also referred, ‘Universal Design’ (UD).7
In order to expand the bulk of accessible goods (both universally designed products and
AT)8 manufactured and marketed in the EU, the Strategy has emphasized ‘demand side’
solutions, focused on the enactment of new legislation and the enhancing of standardiz-
ation.9 In more general terms, the Commission aims to increase the demand of accessible
goods by imposing accessibility obligations, or by facilitating the development of common
standards or accessibility requirements.
In the EDS 2010–2020, rather surprisingly State aid is not mentioned expressis verbis.
Despite the fact that the EU has an exclusive competence on ‘the establishing of the com-
petition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’,10 and that State aid is
explicitly mentioned as an area of EU exclusive power in the declaration annexed to the
decision to conclude the UNCRPD,11 the Strategy neglects the central role played by the
EU in regulating the market and consequently neglects the opportunity to promote acces-
sible technology through State aid. This oversight is, however, counterbalanced by different
provisions referring to both the rights of people with disabilities and accessibility in EU
State aid law. The 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER),12 which will be dis-
cussed further in this article, includes several references to the UNCRPD, to the EDS
2010–2020, and to accessibility. However, these references are limited to the provisions
on accessibility of cultural goods and heritage, and to those articles on aid related to the
training and hiring of workers with disabilities (which largely recite the previous articles
included in the 2008 GBER: Ferri and Marquis 2011).13 It is therefore safe to suggest
that, up to now, EU State aid law and policy has not been included in the toolbox of
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policy options available to the Commission (or, more precisely, to the Member States) to
improve the availability and choice of AT and universally designed products for their
intended market (Ferri 2015). It may be argued that this is a likely consequence of the
restraint of the Commission in boosting the ‘supply side’, i.e. encouraging the production
of accessible goods as a whole. This is also in line with the ‘less-aid’ policy and the purely
economic approach to State aid professed by the Commission in the EU State Aid Modern-
isation (SAM),14 which will be discussed in the next Section.
Against this background, this article argues that EU State aid law has a great, yet unex-
plored, potential to ameliorate the availability of accessible goods and services across the
EU. Building upon a previous piece of research (Ferri 2015), this article attempts to demon-
strate how EU State aid law can be meaningfully used to incentivize developers to increase
the production of accessible goods, to adjust or reduce prices and to provide consumers with
a greater selection in a greater number of marketplaces. It further relies on the hypothesis
that the accessible technology market(s) present(s) common trends and identifiable failures,
whichmay be addressed and overcome by amore active role of the State within the framework
of a more targeted EU State aid policy. This hypothesis is grounded in economic evidence and
draws inspiration from the economic study recently published by Mariana Mazzuccato in the
book The Enterpreneurial State (Mazzucato 2011), which the title of this work echoes.
Further to these introductory remarks, this article is divided into six sections, followed
by a brief series of concluding remarks. Section 2 provides an overview of the EU system of
State aid law, with the intent of establishing the pertinent legal context. Section 3 briefly
addresses the main characteristics and failures of the accessible technology market.
Section 4 discusses why State aid might be necessary to create an EU-wide market for
accessible products. It identifies the rationale behind creating a more prominent role for
the State in addressing and overcoming market failures. Sections 5 and 6 address the
role of the EU in controlling State aid. In particular, Section 5 explores whether and to
what extent the past legal framework has allowed Member States to subsidize accessible
technology. It will further explore and place a particular emphasis on aid assessed under
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU – in light of the 2006 Research, Development and Innovation Fra-
mework (2006 R&D&I Framework),15 as well as in light of the 2006 Guidelines on State
aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized enterprises (Risk Capital
Guidelines).16 It also focuses on the arguable role of 2008 GBER in allowing Member
States to use public subsidies to encourage the production of accessible technology.
Section 6 discusses the potential of the updated legal framework, which entered into
force in July 2014, namely the new R&D&I Framework17 and risk finance aid guidelines,18
and the novel GBER. The article concludes by reflecting upon the potential of EU State aid
to improve the accessible technology market and ultimately contribute to promoting the
rights of people with disabilities.
2. State aid in the EU: an overview
Subsidies and other forms of public intervention cannot be adopted freely by the EU
Member States. Since its inception, the EU has continually introduced rules that control
State aid. These, often significant, constraints have sought to restrict national policy-
makers in how they grant money to markets and market actors in order to ensure the func-
tioning of the internal market. Article 107(1) TFEU provides that any aid granted by a
Member State or through state resources that distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is incompatible
with the internal market, insofar as it affects trade between the Member States. In other
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words, State measures are prohibited if the criteria listed in Article 107(1) TFEU (namely,
transfer of State resources, economic advantage, selectivity, distortion of competition, and
effect on trade between Member States) are satisfied (Plender 2004; Quingley 2009; Biondi
2013; De Cecco 2013). However, Art. 107(2) and (3) TFEU sets out exemptions to the
general ban contained in Art. 107(1) TFEU on the premise that markets are incapable of
being entirely self-regulating at all times, and this may necessitate some intervention
from the State for these same markets to operate more effectively, raise consumer
welfare, and/or to protect and promote specific rights or values. Art. 107(2) TFEU specifies
a number of cases in which national support measures are permissible.19 These categories,
which are listed in Article 107(2), are automatically exempted from the prohibition of
Article 107(1) TFEU and are called de jure derogations. Art. 107(3) TFEU states that
some other forms of aid may be considered compatible with the internal market. Among
them, it lists: aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of
living is abnormally low or where there is underemployment (lett. a), aid to promote the
execution of a project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy of a Member State (lett. b), and aid to facilitate the development of
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest (lett. c).20
The EU’s supervisory role of State aid is based on a system of ex ante authorization by
the Commission pursuant to Art. 108 TFEU. This means that measures constituting State
aids are prohibited unless the Commission has been notified of such measures, has assessed
them under the scope of Art. 107(2) or (3) TFEU, and has finally approved them. Aid falling
under the de jure derogations set forth in Art. 107(2) TFEU are generally considered com-
patible with the internal market. The case law of the Court of Justice has repeatedly demon-
strated that Art. 107(3) TFEU must be interpreted strictly.21 However, it is commonly
acknowledged that the Commission has significant discretion in carrying out an assessment
of economic, technical and policy considerations, and has quite a wide leeway when eval-
uating whether the aid is appropriate and proportionate to achieve relevant policy goals.22
To increase legal certainty and predictability in the assessment under Art. 107(3) TFEU and
in the efforts of identifying common principles for evaluating the compatibility of an aid
measure with the internal market, the Commission has also passed various guidelines,
mainly in the forms of ‘communication’ (Stefan 2013).23
For the purpose of this analysis, it is worth noting that the Commission has defined both
conditions under which public funding of R&D&I generates common benefits while limit-
ing the negative effects from distortions to competition, and the criteria to assess State sub-
sidies to SMEs in the form of risk capital.24 In a nutshell, the new Framework for State aid
for R&D&I, which entered into force in July 2014, is underpinned (as was its predecessor)
by public interventions that are effectively targeted towards growth-enhancing activities,
which limit market distortions that would undermine the competitive nature of the internal
market. In the Impact assessment document, the Commission plainly states that its actions
must ‘ensure both that companies can receive the support they may need to address those
market failures that hamper R&D&I activities and that aid is limited to the minimum
necessary’.25 This approach has not substantially altered, but the new framework seeks
to provide clarity and ensure that State aid incentivizes industry to undertake additional
R&D&I investments. The 2014 Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments
intend to address the difficulties faced by SMEs in gaining access to finance, which con-
tinue to be exacerbated in this period of financial crisis. The concept of market failure in
SMEs’ access to finance is central to the Guidelines. They do however balance the need
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to address market failures against the need to make European SMEs more competitive in the
global marketplace without unnecessarily distorting competition.
Treaty rules and guidelines are complemented by a composite system of secondary
regulations. It is worth remembering that Art. 109 TFEU allows for the adoption of second-
ary legislation in the field of State aid. Under this provision, the Council adopted Regulation
994/98,26 i.e. the Enabling Regulation, which has empowered the Commission to adopt
individual regulations in which it declares certain types of aid to be lawful and exempts
them from the obligation of prior notification.27
Although the Treaty provisions themselves have remained relatively static, State aid
law and policy as awhole is subject to constant development. The enactment of newguidelines
and regulations is part of a deep process of modernization to achieve ‘less and better targeted
State aid’. One of the aims of the StateAidModernization (SAM) package is an ‘assessment of
genuinemarket failures’. TheCommissionhas often stated that aid is justifiedonlywhere itwill
correct market failures, although the meaning of this particular concept has yet to be defined,
and, according to scholarship, the concept is not applied in a consistent and clear manner (Lang
2014). The SAM places a greater emphasis than before on the balancing test that the Commis-
sion must engage with in order to balance the negative impacts of the aid measure on compe-
tition with any positive impacts on remedying market failures (or on achieving other policy
objectives). The SAMpackage intends to encourage schemes that support growth, but attempts
to put clear limits to aid measures that do not produce real benefit and distort competition.
This commitment is clearly reflected in the soft law mentioned above (both the 2014
R&D&I Framework and the Risk Finance Guidelines), as well as in the regulations enacted.
It is worth recalling that, from 2001 to 2006, the Commission approved a series of
exemption regulations,28 consolidated and replaced by the 2008 GBER, in force until 30
June 2014 (Deiberova and Nyssens 2009), when it was replaced by a new 2014
GBER.29 The new GBER has extended the scope of aid that is exempted from prior noti-
fication, in order for the Commission to refocus on those cases most likely to have a dis-
tortive effect. As with its predecessor, the new GBER covers several categories of aid
including aid in the form of risk capital, aid for research, development and innovation,
and lays down the conditions under which state aid can be considered compatible with
the internal market, and exempted from notification requirements.30 In addition, the
thresholds up to which R&D&I aid can be granted without prior Commission scrutiny
have been significantly increased: for example, aid of up to E15 million can be awarded
for enhancing the prototyping phase, without prior approval.31 The threshold is even
higher for cross-border projects.
It thus appears that the present trend of EU State aid law and policy acts to foster ‘sus-
tainable, smart and inclusive growth in a competitive internal market’, while ensuring that
only ‘good aid’ is granted, i.e. aid that is well-designed, targeted at visibly identified market
failures and objectives of common interest, and are the least distortive option available
(Segura Catala´n and Clayton 2013).32
3. The accessible technology market(s): trends and failures
EU State aid policy is more than ever focused on the concept of market failures. Despite any
(grounded) criticism, which might be raised against the Commission practice, it is clear that
the SAM wants inter alia to restrain aid to those situations in which the market does not
work properly if left alone – limiting subsidies that would be ineffectively implemented
by Member States. Thus, the next necessary step in this analysis is to ascertain whether
in the case of accessible technology there is a market failure to ‘heal’.
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Before discussing whether there is a market failure, it seems useful to ascertain whether
we can deal with a unique accessible technology market. As discussed in the Editorial of
this Special Issue (Ferri, Giannoumis, and O’Sullivan 2015), ‘accessible technology’
encompasses both universally designed technological goods and AT, which might be
seen as complementary products (Vanderheiden 1998; Bauer and Elsaesser 2012). Owing
to the large range of different products that can be qualified as accessible technology, it
is impossible to conceive and identify a singular and unique ‘relevant market’ of accessible
technology in the meaning currently employed within competition law analysis.33 Since the
publication of the 1997 ‘Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the pur-
poses of Community competition law’,34 the relevant market has been defined by referring
to two specific dimensions: the product and the geographic market. The product market
embraces all those products and/or services that are regarded as interchangeable or substi-
tutable by the consumer by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their
intended use, and this is clearly not applicable to accessible technology as defined
above. Indeed, we could hardly even speak of an AT market. AT comprises all the
devices that support functional needs of people who experience difficulties linked to dis-
ability or ageing, including medical devices, and encompasses diverse products (from
low-tech devices, such as wheelchairs to high-tech products such as cochlear implants),
which are not interchangeable by their very nature. Universally designed technologies
also encompass a diverse range of products. The relevant geographic market is usually
defined as the area in which the firms concerned are involved in the supply of products
or services and in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous.
Again, in the case of accessible goods, we could individuate several national and/or local
overlapping markets. Although the annual value of the EU market for assistive devices
as a whole has been estimated atE30 billion,35 in the field of AT, with the notable exception
of hearing aids, the main producers are small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which
usually sell their products locally or nationally (Stack et al. 2009; Giannoumis and Kline
2014). Universal design has not been sufficiently operationalized and it is difficult to
speak about universally designed goods. Those goods that attempt to respect universal
design principles represent a niche segment of the EU market (Gassmann and Reepmeyer
2008), and if they are produced, they are sold mainly at the national or local level.
However, these multifaceted and internally diversified markets for universally designed
technology and AT present common trends and failures that might justify a State interven-
tion and a specific or explicit EU State aid ‘provision’ to allow it.
The AT market(s) as a whole, despite experiencing an upward trend (AEGIS 2009),
appears underdeveloped. There is a need for further research and development (R&D) to
improve existing products and create new ones. Whilst several experimental projects
already exist,36 few new products are actually produced and are therefore incapable of
reaching the market. Thus, despite the efforts of these research and development projects,
the AT currently sold is often old, deficient or unsatisfactory.37 In cases of particularly
severe physical disabilities, the AT currently on the market is frequently inappropriate for
the individualized needs of the person. Foley and Ferri (2012) note that while ‘mass-
market technologies are typically designed for broad (non-disabled) audiences, assistive
technology is designed around assumptions about disabilities and disabled users that
may or may not be accurate’.38 It is also highlighted that more research on usability and
on how devices function in society is needed in, and that user-centred design (UCD)
approaches that encourage consideration of all users (Wallach and Scholz 2012), including
carers and trainers, should be improved and adopted by industries developing and produ-
cing AT (Lenker et al. 2013). However, companies are generally unwilling to develop
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products that have a high ‘technical complexity’ and thus necessitate higher advanced cost
outlays without an express demand. Secondly, as highlighted by the ‘European Thematic
Network on Assistive Technologies and Inclusive Solutions for All’, people with disabil-
ities are not viewed as potential consumers,39 but rather as people in need of assistance.
This vision is reinforced by the fact that AT are mainly provided through health or social
services, or, more generally, support schemes for people with disabilities (Service Delivery
Models – SDMs). SDMs are either medically or socially oriented, rather than consumer
oriented. This means that the service provider acts as an intermediary between the
supply (available assistive products) and the final end-user (person with disabilities), and
the final end-user does not decide on whether the assistive product meets their needs.
SDMs usually include lists of eligible products, which often are not the most advanced
(or the newest) (Giannoumis and Kline 2014).40 Harris (2010) highlights that items
given to users and funded wholly through the public system were ‘prescribed’ by pro-
fessionals and the users did not have the ability to express even a preference for the item
‘prescribed’. By comparison, those users in the private purchase arena are overwhelmed
with the available choices, and deciding between high and low-end products, the latter
often constituting a lower quality device, is often difficult.41 Deloitte, in its study on assis-
tive ICT, argues that in some countries little or no assistive ICT solutions are part of the
‘positive list’ of procured products through the SDMs. Hence, SDMs themselves function
as a barrier to innovation (Deloitte 2003). Overall, the important ‘chicken-and-egg’ chal-
lenge in the AT marketplace proves that industry (and more specifically any SME) is reluc-
tant to invest in products without an expressed demand from service providers, whereas
service providers cannot get engaged unless there are products to work with.
UD emerged from the convergence of barrier-free environments, accessible design and
AT, and their importance has been greatly emphasized by disability studies. The latter have
evidenced the role of UD as a way to set aside AT, which operates from a deficit based,
medical model orientation, resulting in an ‘apartheid of “special needs”’ (Goggin and
Newell 2003). However, according to Gassmann and Reepmeyer (2008), private industry
has very little experience with UD. Foley and Ferri (2012) affirm that UD itself presents
a significant problem since it ‘suggests the possibility of universal access, even when pro-
ducts that have gone through a UD design process might not be universally accessible in
practice’. The costs of UD are still unknown, and common concerns about adopting UD
are that ‘it will slow down the time to market, and increase design, manufacturing, and cus-
tomer support costs’ (Vanderheiden and Tobias 2000). As extensively argued by Bauer and
Elsaesser (2012), improving a technology to make it ‘more universal’ means increasing the
level of impairment ‘tolerated’ in its use, and thus increasing the technical complexity, will
correspondingly increase costs. These costs constrain the private sector’s engagement in
UD. Even though, in the long run, UD should gain more commercial relevance because
it is potentially appealing not only to buyers with disabilities, but also to elderly customers,
and ideally to all consumers’ groups, UD may be still perceived by some companies as a
special interest of people with disabilities, who, as mentioned before, are not viewed as
potential consumers.
The fast pace of technological change is also an issue for both universally designed pro-
ducts and AT: by the time an accessible version is developed, mainstream technology has
often been updated or otherwise changed (Foley and Ferri 2012). In some cases, technology
is more accessible in its earlier version than in later iterations: for example, Internet
Explorer now has fewer accessibility features than earlier iterations (Ellis and Kent 2011).42
In conclusion, even where one considers accessible technology to constitute a patch-
work of markets, common trends and failures appear. Accessibility is not always a
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primary concern in the development of new technologies, and preconceptions about people
with disabilities as people in need rather than consumers remain the dominant narrative. In
addition, industries seem to underestimate the fact that technology designed for disability
does not have to be segregated to any particular market: ‘there are many examples of the
crossover appeal of technologies for disabled users, making it difficult to draw a hard
and fast line between what is and is not considered assistive technology’ (Foley and
Ferri 2012). Overall, in the development cycle of new technologies, there is often industry
unwilling to engage in product innovation43 and in experimental products that require
massive costs to provide technology that is usable by people with disabilities. This chal-
lenge echoes a common trend in the technology sector: the decision to innovate often
takes place under great uncertainty, and the path from an idea to a marketable product is
quite long. Thus, the main market failure in the accessible technology market is the so-
called ‘valley of death’ which exists between basic research (often academic research)
and the commercialization of a new product.44
4. The EU, the ‘entrepreneurial state’ and accessible technology
4.1. A ‘demand-side approach’: the dark side of the moon
The main market failure of the accessible technology market(s) can be roughly identified as
the ‘valley of death’, i.e. the substantive lack of R&D, which leads to the commercialization
of newproducts on theEUmarket. This failure,which is typical of the high techmarket, is actu-
ally evident in bothATandUD ICT, because of the unwillingness of private industry to engage
in developing new technologywith undefined costs and undetermined demand. It is commonly
acknowledged that the AT market is currently subject to great change and that more user-
centred and flexible approaches are being generated. However, a lack of R&D in private
industries is still tangible. This deficiency of R&D is even more evident when it comes to
universally designed products. Overall, there are very few innovative accessible goods sold
on the internal market at affordable prices, and the market itself is still highly fragmented.
As previously mentioned, the EDS 2010–2020 somewhat acknowledges, though not
explicitly, the existence of a market failure, especially with regards to AT. Nonetheless, it
focuses on improving the demand-side of accessible technology through legislation and
standardization, rather than incentivizing production. Building upon well-rooted practice,
the Commission intends to present legislative proposals aimed at improving and comple-
menting existing laws (Boyle 2009; Waddington 2009; Lawson 2010), to address different
aspects of accessibility in transportation, in ICT or in public procurement, using Article 114
TFEU as a legal basis.45 The main short-term objective is a cross-cutting ‘European Acces-
sibility Act’. This piece of legislation should not only address public authorities that procure
goods and services, but also private parties, i.e. manufacturers, distributors, sellers and ser-
vices providers and should state, at various levels, duties to deliver accessible products and
services (Ahtonen and Pardo 2012; Charitakis 2013).46 Thus, the Strategy should embrace
the view that increasing the demand for these accessible products should indirectly support
an increase in the supply of the same, and ultimately stimulate a virtuous market circle,
without the need of direct ‘supply side’ measures, such as subsidies or tax credits to produ-
cers, which might alter free competition.
From this perspective, the main issues to be addressed are whether these tools are actu-
ally sufficient and as effective as the Commission states to overcome the market failure out-
lined above, and whether they are capable of doing so by 2020. The answer to these two
questions would appear to be negative, for two somewhat overlapping reasons.
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First, on a substantial point, harmonization measures might certainly reduce fragmenta-
tion on the EU market, but do not have a direct effect on R&D and the commercialization of
new products. In this respect, Faeh’s analysis seems particularly relevant (Faeh 2013). In
investigating the pharmaceutical sector in the EU, the author concluded that it is very dif-
ficult to establish a correlation between market harmonization and investment in innovation
or R&D. He states that, whilst a certain level of harmonization is fundamental to incentiviz-
ing producers to launch new products in the Union market, only financial incentives can
contribute substantially to R&D investments and their resulting innovations. Faeh
affirms that it is difficult to transfer the outcome of his analysis to other innovative
sectors (as they are subject to other rules and framework conditions). However, although
acknowledging the peculiarity of the pharma sector (especially with regards to pricing
and reimbursement of medicinal products), it seems that this conclusion might be applicable
to the field of accessible technology, bearing in mind that many ATs are medical devices
strictu sensu. With regards to UD, as highlighted by Vanderheiden and Tobias (2000),
accessibility obligations imposed by means of legislation (i.e. harmonization legislation)
might improve the design of mainstream products, but is likely to cause the industry to
stop at exactly those targets provided for in the legislation, preventing further innovation.
Secondly, from a pragmatic perspective, EU legislation takes a long time to be
implemented and take effect. The case of the ‘European Accessibility Act’ is exemplary.
At this stage, notwithstanding the renewed commitment expressed by the Commission at
the European Day of Persons with Disabilities on 3 December 2014, it is still fairly uncer-
tain what the real scope and actual content of this act will be and when a full proposal will
be divulged. As denounced by the European Blind Union (EBU), in its 2015 work pro-
gramme, the Commission did not even mention the European Accessibility Act. Similarly,
the new Directive extending the material scope of the provisions against discrimination on
the ground of religion and belief, disability, age and sexual orientation beyond the area of
employment, into the fields of social protection, including access to and supply of goods
and other whose proposal was released by the Commission in 2008, is ‘buried under
sand’.47 This proposal does not contain express accessibility obligations, but conceptualiz-
ing ‘denial of reasonable accommodation’ as a form of discrimination, in compliance with
the UNCRPD, could indirectly boost accessibility and the demand of accessible technology.
4.2. A ‘supply-side’ approach
The demand-side approach adopted by the Commission seems insufficient and not fully
capable of tackling the market failures related to accessible technology. But this still
does not answer the question of whether specific supply-side measures, and particularly
State aid, are needed to bridge this gap. There are three main arguments to support the expli-
cit inclusion of State aid among the Commission’s policy options to nudge the market in a
more accessible direction.
First, supply-side measures might fit in a framework together with demand-side tools,
and effectively complement them, especially with regard to the high-tech market. Mazzu-
cato’s analysis is particularly relevant in this respect. While her discussion is complex and
not conducive to providing succinct overviews, for the purpose of this investigation, we can
refer to a few key points. Even though Mazzucato does not encourage cutting blanket
support to small firms or a wide R&D tax credit, she envisages a more complex strategy
in which the ‘entrepreneurial State’ plays an active role in generating innovation-led
growth. In this vision, ‘the state’s role cannot be limited to that of planting seeds that
can be subsequently relied on to grow freely’. In her thought-provoking pamphlet,
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Mazzucato contends that ‘[n]ot only has government funded the riskiest research, whether
applied or basic, but it has indeed often been the source of the most radical, path-breaking
types of innovation’ (Mazzucato 2011). She claims that ‘often public sector funding ends up
doing much more than fixing market failures . . . It leads the growth process rather than just
incentivising or stabilising it’. In applying this to the biotech industry in the US, Mazzucato
shows that, on the one hand, the knowledge base, which biopharmaceutical companies are
dependent on, has developed, to a greater extent, from government investment than from
business. She also shows that this investment complemented venture capital and public
equity funds, which hand been poured into the industry. This conclusion seems particularly
pertinent for, and transferable to, the accessible technology market, which needs a more
complex action that goes beyond simply funding basic research and setting regulations.
This finding is even more obvious, with regards to UD, given that only supply-side and
demand-side incentives provided through public policy might overcome compounding
high cost factors (Bauer and Elsaesser 2012).
Secondly, ‘supply-side’ measures, and namely State aid (includingmeasures as inter alia
subsidies, tax credits, or public venture capital)48 complement other research policies, which
are affixed to basic research. At the EU level, it is undeniable that several promotional initiat-
ives to boost R&D in the field of accessible technology (especially on AT)49 have been put in
place. The EU has fostered innovation andKey Enabling Technologies (KETs),50 in linewith
the EU2020 Strategy51 and Innovation Union.52 The latter Innovation Union flagship initiat-
ive is intended to incentivize R&D&I that addresses the challenges faced by society, includ-
ing but not limited to health and demographic change (especially the increasing elderly
population). In this respect, the EU is also advancing a European Innovation Partnership
on Active and Healthy Ageing,53 and is discussing a more active participation of the EU
in the Ambient Assisted Living Joint Programme.54 The latter focuses precisely on the
‘valley of death’ link of the innovation chain where research results need to be translated
into new products and services ready to enter the market. However, these initiatives in
most cases have not led to the commercialization of new products, and their outcomes are
most likely long-term results. At present, these research initiatives, which are capable of
bringing about affirmative change, have not yet improved the overall availability of new pro-
ducts at costs affordable for most consumers. The ‘valley of death’ therefore has yet to be
eliminated or significantly alleviated, as general EU State aid law, as already acknowledged,
allows only certain R&D&I subsidies. Other forms of more direct State intervention on the
market to improve R&D on accessible technology could complement the efforts already in
place and could be considered in compliance with the EU legal framework.
Third, ‘supply-side measures’ might have side effects, altering competition. However,
this is a well-known drawback that the Commission is already trying to tackle in the SAM.
The lack of any reference to State aid with regards to accessible technology is thus not redu-
cible to the Commission’s concern that Member States engage in rare subsidies. In addition,
it appears quite questionable that a far less cautious approach has been adopted with regard
to standardization in the context of accessibility, which is also problematic, not only
because of its legitimacy, but also for its potentially anticompetitive effects.55
5. Has state aid to R&D fostered accessible technology up to now?
5.1. Setting the scene
Having discussed the prospective benefits of a ‘supply-side approach’, the potential for
State aid to boost the EU accessible technology market is best discussed by looking at
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how, up to now, EU State aid law has allowed Member States to address the market failure
common to AT and UD technology. As this market failure largely takes the form of the pre-
viously discussed ‘valley of death’, we will look at how the 2006 R&D&I Framework,
applicable as of 1 January 2007 until June 2014 and replaced by new Framework, has
pushed the market in a more accessible direction, despite any specific engagement on acces-
sible technology. Since ATs are mainly produced by SMEs or even micro-enterprises, atten-
tion will also be given to aid assessed in line with the risk finance guidelines, which, as
highlighted in Section 2, were underpinned by the rationale of facilitating access to risk
capital through the use of public funds, overcoming the unwillingness to accept risks in
high technology markets due to extreme uncertainty, resulting from the impossibility of pre-
dicting results and profits.
5.2. State aid assessed under the R&D&I framework
The 2006 R&D&I Framework defined the Commission’s margin of appreciation in asses-
sing the compatibility of State aid under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, or under Article 107(3)(b)
TFEU (in the case of research that contributes in a clear and identifiable manner to the EUs
overall interests).56 It encompassed various types of aid aimed at fostering ‘fundamental
research’ (experimental or theoretical work undertaken to acquire new knowledge), ‘indus-
trial research’ (research for developing new products, or for bringing about a significant
improvement in existing products), and ‘experimental development’ (the acquisition and
use of existing scientific, technological, business for new, altered or improved products,
processes or services). In essence, the types of State aid allowed under this Framework
were: aid for R&D projects; aid for technical feasibility studies; aid to cover SMEs’
costs relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs); aid to young, innovative companies;
aid in support of organization and process innovation in the service industry; aid for
recourse to innovation support and advisory services; aid to SMEs for temporary employ-
ment of highly qualified personnel and aid for innovation clusters (for ‘groupings of inde-
pendent undertakings – innovative start-ups, SMEs and large undertakings as well as
research organizations – operating in a particular sector and region and designed to stimu-
late innovative activity).
For each type of aid, the 2006 R&D&I Framework established aid intensity ceilings,
specifying the percentage of the eligible costs, and stated that the aid should ‘result in
the recipient changing its behaviour so that it increases its level of R&D&I activity’57
and be proportionate. It also provided guidelines that allowed the Commission to verify
the extent of any potential market distortions (in relation to both competition and any
effect on trade), and to validate that the overall balance is positive.
The 2006 R&D&I Framework, as it remains under the current regime, was a horizontal
measure and was not directed at any definitive sector. The 2006 R&D&I Framework instead
addressed the common objective and interest of promoting R&D&I and did not intend to
tackle other policy goals. R&D&I was considered per se an objective to pursue, due to
the potential for economic growth, but this overlooked the functional benefit in the pro-
vision of other public goods (such as public health, accessibility, environmental protection)
that may arise from such measures.
This legal framework has allowed Member States, even in a period of economic crisis,
to heavily subsidize the technological sector as a whole and, in particular, R&D&I activities
of high-tech enterprises.58 In the last ten years, the Commission assessed and approved a
plurality of schemes directed to boost high tech development,59 such as the German
scheme Richtlinie u¨ber die Gewa¨hrung von Zuwendungen fu¨r Forschung, Innovation
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und Technologie des Landes NRW,60 or the Spanish schemes INNOTEK61 and Notificacio´n
Plan Nacional de Investigacio´n Cientı´fica, Desarrollo e Innovacio´n Tecnolo´gica 2008–
2011.62 Although it is very likely that these schemes subsidized inter alia accessible tech-
nology development, none of them included accessibility, UD and AT as key features, and
in its assessment (unsurprisingly) the Commission never considered the goal to promote
accessibility, or market failures specific to accessible technology (Ferri 2015).
Member States also promoted R&D&I of nanotechnology, which is particularly rel-
evant in the field of assistive medical devices (e.g. implants, prosthetics or brain-
machine interfaces). For example, the Commission approved the French aid to STMicroe-
lectronics (ST) for the development of new technologies in the nanoelectronics sector. The
Commission stated that the French measure, aimed at developing new technologies for the
design and production of integrated circuits and at strengthening the Crolles-Grenoble
cluster as a global leader in the field of advanced CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide-
Semiconductor), is in line with EU rules on state aid. Again, none of the aid assessed
was specifically targeted at accessible technology. However, nanoelectronics is a ‘key
enabling technology’, underlying innovation in many branches of industry, and semicon-
ductors are omnipresent in high-speed communications accessible to all, cloud computing,
smart power grids, or e-health (Ferri 2015).63
This horizontal economic approach adopted by the Commission did not encourage
Member States to specifically tackle the development of accessible technology. Neverthe-
less, at the same time it did not impede Member States in putting in place a measure to
pursue a specific policy goal (i.e. accessibility), in so far as this measure fulfilled the
requirements laid down in the 2006 R&D&I Framework. However, the Commission
embraced the view that aid measures aimed at R&D&I activity ‘close to the market’ are
likely to develop negative effects on competition, and in particular significant ‘crowding
out effects’. This made, on the one hand, the Commission more suspicious (and more
careful in its assessment) of aid measures that sustain R&D&I activities, which are adjacent
to the commercialization of the product or the service. On the other hand, it rendered
Member States unwilling to invest public money at an intermediate stage of development,
between basic research and commercialization of a new product, and ultimately left unre-
solved the ‘valley of death’ within the technology sector.
5.3. State aid assessed under the risk capital
The rules by which State subsidies to SME in the form of risk capital are assessed, in force
until June 2014 and recently substituted by new guidelines, are premised on the fact that
there is no general risk capital market failure in the EU, but there are gaps for some
types of investments at certain stages of an enterprises’ development.
The Guidelines implemented a test where Member States (and the Commission in
assessing the aid) could balance the potential positive and negative effects of the aid.
In particular, a risk capital measure was compatible with the internal market when the
following conditions were met. First, the investment tranches should not exceed E2.5
million per enterprise per year. Second, the aid should be granted up to the expansion
or start-up stage of the SMEs. Third, at least 70% of the total budget of the risk
capital measure should be in the form of equity and quasi-equity instruments. Fourth,
at least 50% of the funding should be provided by private investors. Finally, the risk
capital measure should ensure that the decision to invest into target companies are
profit-driven and the management of a risk capital measure or fund must be effected
on a commercial basis.
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The Risk Capital Guidelines highlighted that the national measure was to pursue an
objective of common interest, such as the protection of the environment, economic
growth, employment and cohesion. Although this is not an exhaustive list, it is worth
noting that no explicit reference to accessibility was made. This of course was mirrored
in the national schemes. Similar to what arose under the R&D&I Guidelines, in the assess-
ment of these schemes the Commission did not consider the goal of promoting accessibility,
or market failures specific to accessible technology, even though, in many instances, the
measures approved were likely to boost inter alia accessible technology production. Rel-
evant examples include the Bavarian Risk Capital Scheme ‘Clusterfonds Seed GmbH &
Co. KG’ to support technology focused micro- and small enterprises, and namely to
allow them to conduct R&D for the first prototype or the ‘proof of concept’ (initial
concept),64 and the Spanish INVERTEC, which sought to promote the projects of innova-
tive undertakings and the projects of technologically-based undertakings in Catalonia.65
Another pertinent scheme is the German HighTech Gru¨nderfonds II, a public–private part-
nership to foster investments in high-tech firms that was approved by the Commission in
September 2011.66 In particular, this is a venture capital fund, the biggest investor of
which is the German State through the Ministry of Economics. The fund materially
applies to three different technological fields: IT, Life Sciences and Engineering. The eligi-
bility requirements for obtaining an investment echo the Framework and include, other than
the more formal requirements (concerning age and location of the potential investee), a
technological focus, an entrepreneurial team, and a good market opportunity. Universal
Design, or accessibility are not a condition, although they might increase the potential to
receive investment. The Fund has up to now funded several companies producing different
types of AT: for example, Desino, an entrepreneurial team who developed an active wheel-
chair preventing and reducing lower back pain through its manual hybrid drive and movable
seat;67 Exelonix, an enterprise developing assistance systems for elderly people, which
offers home emergency call functionality along with easy-to-use internet and communi-
cation applications that will enable participation in the information society without bar-
riers;68 and Synoste which develops novel, implantable, patient friendly, cost-effective
and reliable medical devices for correcting skeletal deformities. In some instances, the
schemes approved by the Commission are targeted at medical technologies. This is exem-
plified by the German investment fund Technologiegru¨nderfonds Sachsen (TGFS) put in
place by the Saxony Land69 and approved in 2007. The TGFS aimed to provide capital
to roughly 60 economically stable innovative small and micro enterprises, and especially
to technology-oriented founders, also through equity and quasi-equity investments.
Although not explicitly intended to foster accessible technology, the scheme focused
inter alia on microelectronics and medical technology (which includes medical assistive
devices).
The Commission in its assessment is prone to over-emphasizing the existence of a
market failure. This purely economic approach has certainly been conducive to sustaining
technological industry and innovation. It does not however seem per se sufficient to
direct or incentivize Member States to subsidize the development of accessible
technology.
5.4. The GBER and aid to foster accessible technology
The 2008 GBER covered several categories of aid relevant to the EU2020 goals that could
be used by Member States to nurture technological innovation. It encompassed inter alia
investment related to SMEs, aid in the form of risk capital, and aid for R&D&I. The
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 149
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
9:0
6 1
3 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
2008 GBER established the conditions under which State aid could be considered compa-
tible with the internal market and exempted from prior notification. The aid should be trans-
parent within the meaning of the GBER,70 respect the thresholds laid down in Article 6, and
have an incentive effect (Article 8 GBER).
Aid in the form of risk capital was covered by Section 6 (Articles 28 et seq.), while aid
for R&D&I was covered by Section 7 (Articles 31 et seq.) of the 2008 GBER. According to
Article 29, risk capital measures should take the form of participation in a profit-driven
private equity investment fund, managed on a commercial basis, and the investment to
be made by the investment fund was not to exceed E1.5 million per undertaking per
year. Similarly to what was provided in the Risk Capital Guidelines, at least 70% of the
total budget invested in SMEs should be in the form of equity and quasi-equity instruments,
and at least 50% of the funding should be provided by private investors.71 Article 31
exempted from notification aid for fundamental research, industrial research, and exper-
imental development. The aid intensity ceiling amounted to 100% of the eligible costs
for fundamental research; 50% of the eligible costs for industrial research, 25% of the eli-
gible costs for experimental development. Aid intensities for industrial research and exper-
imental development could be increased in case of aid granted to SMEs, in case of projects
that involved collaboration between at least two undertakings, between an undertaking and
a research organization, and in case of industrial research, when the results of the project
were widely disseminated.72
Undoubtedly, the 2008 GBER allowed for several public financial measures supporting
SME and boosting R&D&I, but the impact on the accessible technology market seems
limited. Under Articles 28 and 29, Member States put in place different risk capital
measures to boost the high-tech sector, such as the Austrian ‘Obero¨sterreichischer High-
techfonds’73 or the Italian ‘Fondo Nazionale per l’Innovazione – Capitale di rischio’74.
Even though these kinds of schemes are quite likely to affect the development and pro-
duction of accessible technology, none of them targeted accessible technology, and there
is no clear evidence that they have actually contributed to increasing accessibility.
Other measures, allowed under Article 31 GBER, were relevant for subsidizing acces-
sible technology, but their impact remains limited. For instance, few Member States pro-
vided direct grants for industrial research and experimental development in the field of
AAL: notable examples are the Danish AAL – Ambient Assisted Living, and the Italian
Regional scheme (Marche) ‘Casa intelligente per una longevita` attiva ed indipendente del-
l’anziano’. Under the UK’s ‘Technology Strategy Board Research, Development and Inno-
vation scheme’ numerous calls for funding AAL projects (together with other funding
opportunities to design technology-based products and services) were launched. The Bavar-
ian scheme ‘Hochtechnologien fu¨r das 21. Jahrhundert’75 currently supports research and
development in the fields of life sciences, information and communication technology,
microsystems technology, materials science, energy and environment, mechatronics, nano-
technology and process and production technology in accordance with information proces-
sing and information systems, and software development. Even though the scheme is not
targeted to accessible technology, it is intended to subsidize the development of key com-
ponents for communication systems, including microelectronics and innovative appli-
cations such as multimedia, or Intelligent Home Automation (which might fall within the
broad group of accessible technology). In addition, the scheme unambiguously covers
research and experimental development projects in the area of ‘Gerontotechnologie’, inno-
vative technologies for robotics in the nursing field, for accessible home automation and for
other procedures and methods of preservation and enhancement of quality of life and
independence.76
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6. The new rules: is the EU enhancing an ‘entrepreneurial state in the field of
accessible technology?
6.1. The new guidelines for R&D&I and risk capital
As of 1 July 2014, new guidelines on aid to R&D&I have entered into force. As part of the
SAM, the Commission deemed it necessary to ‘adjust’ the scope of the previous Frame-
work, and better clarify the distinction between economic and non-economic activities of
R&D&I, as well as making the Framework a more flexible instrument and allowing
Member States to better support innovation. The new Framework elaborated by the Com-
mission and published in May 2014 is complementary to the GBER,77 and aims to increase
R&D spending, as well as to ‘facilitate the transition of knowledge and ideas to the
market’.78 Three features are potentially relevant. First, the Commission has opted again
for a horizontal approach, so that the Framework will apply in all sectors governed by
the Treaty, and has attempted to grant the Member States more flexibility in implementing
R&D&I aid. Second, it has better clarified the criteria for distinguishing between economic
and non-economic activities (giving Member States greater certainty on the instances where
public funding does not constitute State aid). The aid thresholds, beyond which support
would no longer be covered by the GBER and would have thereby to be notified to the
Commission, have been increased. Third, the R&D&I Framework has re-designed the
limit of aid intensity; in particular, it allows, for individually notified measures, aid up to
70% of eligible costs for large companies and 90% for small companies.
On the one hand, the Commission has adopted a conservative approach, sticking to a
general conception that the R&D&I is a goal in itself: ‘the general objective of R&D&I
aid is the promotion of R&D&I in the Union’. Even though it is mentioned that R&D&I
aid should contribute to the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy of delivering
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, as in the previous framework, there are no other
policy goals mentioned. The Commission has not embraced the vision that R&D&I has
to be seen as a means to reach further social goals.79 The Commission should have probably
acted more courageously and considered that State aid for R&D&I might be an important
tool for reaching other strategic policy objectives and fulfilling societal needs, within the
frame of the ‘social market economy envisaged by the Treaty’.80 The promotion of the
rights of people with disabilities through the development of accessible technology, as
one of the end goals that R&D&I schemes should adopt, could have been integrated in
the Framework. There are several arguments that might support this view. Beside the ‘con-
stitutional argument’, it cannot be underestimated that increasing accessibility through new
technologies is a commitment that the EU has undertaken at the international level by con-
cluding the UNCRPD. Hence, a reference to accessibility, disability rights or even a general
mentioning of the UNCRPD would have been in compliance with the international obli-
gation undertaken and the declaration of competence annexed to the concluding decision
of the UNCRPD (Ferri 2015).81 On the other hand, the Commission retains its vigilant
economic appraisal: higher aid levels will only be made available if there is a genuine
gap in financing, in order to avoid undue market distortions with regard to competition
and trade. In the accessible technology market there is a clear failure that could have
been addressed more explicitly in the Framework.
For these reasons, the new Framework does not explicitly incentivize Member States to
increase public funding of R&D&I (in particular industrial research) on UD and AT, even
though it does not discourage them from taking the initiative to do so. The Commission, in
substance, leaves to the Member States the choice on whether or not to invest in accessible
technology.
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The Commission has also adopted new guidelines setting out the conditions under
which Member States can grant aid in the form of risk capital. The new guidelines have
an enlarged scope, now including SMEs and companies with a medium capitalization
(midcaps), and encompass a wider range of financial instruments, including equity,
quasi-equity (already provided for the former 2006 guidelines), loans and guarantees.
The Commission has also slightly redesigned the role and the weight of private investors,
which is more tailored to the development stage and riskiness of the investment. In particu-
lar, the Commission intends to allow higher levels of public support to be extended to
company-creation, where the private business finance markets are reluctant to provide
the necessary financing. The new guidelines also set out clearer conditions for tax incen-
tives to investors.
In the Commission’s estimations, these guidelines should help companies overcome the
‘valley of death’, when bringing new products and ideas to market. This is particularly rel-
evant for accessible technology production, since, as mentioned above, in the fields of both
universally designed technological goods and AT, industry is quite unwilling to engage in
experimental products that require considerable advanced financial outlays with a corre-
spondingly low or indeterminate demand. It is hard to predict whether, without any specific
drive towards accessible technology, aid measures will be taken to address that particular
market. In addition, whilst the Commission pursues an almost exclusively economic
approach, the key issue remains how the balancing test is applied in cases of accessible
technology, where there is scope for economic analysis and the state aid intends to
remedy a market failure.
6.2. The new GBER
The new GBER aims to confer to Member States more leeway in granting State aid without
prior notification and approval by the Commission (provided that certain conditions are
met). It significantly extends the possibilities for Member States to grant aid, but introduces
ex post requirements (i.e. evaluation of large aid schemes and transparency on aid
measures). The Commission has also included novel categories of aid: among them, it
has explicitly crafted ‘aid to innovation clusters and aid to process and organizational
innovation’.82
For the purpose of this analysis, it is worth noting that the scope of risk finance aid and
R&D&I has been broadened. In respect of R&D projects, notification thresholds have been
doubled, and the conditions for support for prototypes and pilot projects have been simpli-
fied. However, the Commission focuses on economic growth, rather than on the idea (and
goal) of ‘inclusive’ innovation. As mentioned in the Introduction, the GBER includes
several references to accessibility, to the EDS, and to the UNCRPD, but not in relation
to R&D&I or Risk Capital where they relate to accessible technology. The lack of a specific
understanding of the failures and trends within the accessible technology market are as such
now part of the new GBER, and it is unlikely to encourage Member States to use State
resources meaningfully for AT and UD.
7. Concluding remarks
The EDS 2010–2020 has redirected its focus towards improving accessibility and reducing
fragmentation in the market of accessible goods and services. However, it has adopted a
relatively narrow number of tools that fit these purposes, and has prioritized the use of legis-
lation and standardization as the most suitable means of nudging the market in a more
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accessible direction. One of the main reasons that the Commission might consider State aid
an instrument to be ‘handled with care’ is the fear that it will lead Member States to abuse it
as a mechanism and unnecessarily distort competition within the internal market. This is
however unsatisfactory, and somewhat alarmist.
In order to negate the ‘valley of death’, which is a common trend in both the UD and AT
markets, as well as to enhance UD, which is still a very niche market, it is necessary to
engage with supply side mechanisms as well as stimulating demand. State aid could be a
useful tool in this respect. The analysis of the former R&D&I Framework and of the
Risk Capital Guidelines, of the GBER and of their application has attempted to show
that State aid has a great potential to shape the accessible technology market. Its potential
in this respect is still largely unchartered.
In addition to the new GBER, both the new R&D&I Framework and the Risk Capital
Guidelines represent missed opportunities for AT and UD. The Commission sticks to a con-
ception of R&D&I as a good in itself, without attempting to valorize certain types of R&D,
and without actually prioritizing innovation towards certain goals, such as accessibility.
Despite the fact that there is a clear market failure in both the AT and UD markets and
that Member States have a certain room for manoeuvre in subsidizing accessible technol-
ogy, the purely economic approach falls short of the obligation to create an accessible
market that the EU has undertaken by concluding the UNCRPD, and may be detrimental
to the goal of ‘inclusive innovation’ envisaged by the EU2020 Strategy.
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Notes
1. The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clarifies the division of compe-
tences between the EU and Member States. It distinguishes among three main types of compe-
tence: exclusive competences, shared competences and supporting competences. The TFEU
draws up a non-exhaustive list of the fields concerned in each case. In fields under the exclusive
competences (Article 3 of the TFEU), the EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in
these fields. The Member States’ role is therefore limited to applying these acts, unless the
Union authorizes them to adopt certain acts themselves. In areas that correspond to shared com-
petences (Article 4 of the TFEU), the EU and Member States are authorized to adopt binding
acts in these fields. However, Member States may exercise their competence only in so far as
the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence. When the EU
is given a supporting competence (Article 6 of the TFEU), it can only intervene to support, coor-
dinate or complement the action of Member States. Consequently, it has no legislative power in
these fields and may not interfere in the exercise of these competences reserved for Member
States (Ex multis Rossi 2012 and Tridimas 2012).
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2. Council Decision 2010/48/EC, OJ 2010 L 23/35. The Council decision to accede to the
UNCRPD (see ft. 6) is accompanied by an Annex (Annex II) containing a Declaration of Com-
petence, in compliance with Art. 44(1) UNCRPD. The following matters are declared to be
within the exclusive competence of the Union: State aid with respect to both the common
market and the Common Customs Tariff and matters affecting its own public administration
(e.g., recruitment of staff, etc). The Declaration clarifies that competence is shared between
the EU and its Member States with respect to non-discrimination, the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital, agriculture, transport by rail, road, sea and air, taxation,
internal market, equal pay for men and women, trans-European network policy and statistics.
A list of policy fields (in which the EU can exercise supporting competences) includes voca-
tional training and social cohesion. An Appendix, attached to the Declaration, lists an illustra-
tive set of legislative measures in which Union competence is engaged (at least to some extent)
in broad fields such as accessibility, independent living, social inclusion, work and employment,
personal mobility, access to information, statistics and data collection and international
cooperation
3. Communication from the Commission ‘European Disability Strategy 2010–2020: A Renewed
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe’ of 15 November 2010, SEC(2010) 1324 final. The Com-
mission drafted a Commission Staff Working Document to accompany the Strategy. This docu-
ment outlined the initial plan to implement the EDS 2010-2020 and contained a list of actions
foreseen for the period 2010–2015 (SEC (2010) 1324 final).
4. See supra nt. 2.
5. See also Commission Staff Working Document ‘Report on the implementation of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by the European Union’ of 5 June 2014,
SWD(2014) 182 final.
6. AAL refers to ubiquitous computing and sensing, ubiquitous communication, and intelligent
user interfaces.
7. The Strategy refers to ‘Design for all’. In this article, this term is used as a synonym of universal
design (UD). Both these terms will be used interchangeably. The origins of Universal Design
date back to the early 1950s. Because of the high number of veterans of the Second World
War, the public had slowly developed an interest in the needs of disabled people (Gassmann
and Reepmeyer 2008). The theorization of ‘universal design’ started later, namely in 1997,
when a group of architects, led by Ronald Mace, laid down the seven rules of universal
design: equitable use, flexibility in use, simple and intuitive use, perceptible information, toler-
ance for error, low physical effort, and size and space for approach and use. This means that the
design must be useful and marketable to people with diverse abilities and the same means of use
are to be provided for all users. The design must accommodate a wide range of individual pre-
ferences and abilities. The use of the design must be easy to understand, regardless of the user’s
experience, knowledge, language skills, or current concentration level, and must provide
necessary information effectively to the user, regardless of ambient conditions or the user’s
sensory abilities. The design must minimize hazards and adverse consequences of accidental
or unintended actions, and can be used efficiently and comfortably and with a minimum of
fatigue. The seventh principle alludes to the fact that appropriate size and space is provided
for approach, reach, manipulation, and use regardless of user’s body size, posture or mobility.
Article 2 UNCRPD provides a legal definition of universal design, which constitutes a firm
point of reference. This provision states that ‘universal design’ is ‘the design of products,
environments, programmes and services to be usable by all people, to the greatest extent poss-
ible, without the need for adaptation or specialized design’.
8. See Ferri, Giannoumis, and O’Sullivan (2015). See infra Section 2 of this article.
9. Standards are technical specifications defining requirements for products, production processes,
services or test-methods (Borraz 2007; Lemley 2002). They are generally selected by Standard-
Setting Organizations (SSOs), i.e. industry groups that typically consist of participants in an
industry who have expertise in the technologies and products at issue, and evaluate technol-
ogies, products, or methodologies. European Standards are under the responsibility of the Euro-
pean Standardisation Organisations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) and can be used to support EU
legislation and policies. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/
index_en.htm (last accessed 1 April 2015).
10. Art. 3 TFEU.
11. See supra nt. 3.
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12. Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty OJ 2014
L 187/1.
13. Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid
compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty –
General Block Exemption Regulation OJ 2008 L214/3 (amended by Commission Regulation
(EU) No 1224/2013 of 29 November 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 as
regards its period of application OJ 2013 L320/2).
14. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2012) 209, 8.5.2012
(Communication on State Aid Modernisation).
15. Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ 2006 C
323/1.
16. Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-
sized enterprises OJ 2006 C 194/2.
17. Communication from the Commission – Framework for State aid for research and development
and innovation OJ 2014 C 198/1.
18. Guidelines on risk finance aid for 2014-2020 OJ 2014 C19/4.
19. Article 107(2) TFEU lists aid that: (a) has a social character and is granted to individual con-
sumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination as regards the origin of the pro-
ducts; or (b) makes good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences. It
also mentions at letter (c): ‘aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic
of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division’. This exemption is of
limited practical relevance, and indeed it is now about to be ex lege repealed.
20. Article 107(3) TFEU also mentions (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where
such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EU to an extent that is con-
trary to the common interest, and provides that other categories of aid may be included in a
decision of the Council on the proposal of the Commission.
21. Case 730/79, Philip Morris, [1980] ECR 2671.
22. Ex multis Case T–17/03 Schmitz-Gotha Fahrzeugwerke v Commission [2006] ECR II–1139,
paragraph 41, and Joined Cases T–267/08 and T–279/08 Re´gion Nord-Pas-de-Calais
and Communaute´ d’agglome´ration du Douaisis v Commission [2011] ECR II–1999 ; Case
T–319/11, ABN Amro Group NV v Commission 8 April 2014 (not yet published).
23. In the specific area of State aid, the Commission is bound by the guidelines and communications
that it adopts, in so far as they do not depart from the rules in the Treaty and are accepted by the
Member States. See inter alia Joined Cases T–267/08 and T–279/08 Re´gion Nord-Pas-de-
Calais and Communaute´ d’agglome´ration du Douaisis v Commission [2011] ECR II–1999,
paragraphs 129 and 132.
24. Risk capital is a broad concept that includes a growing number of types of investment. In the EU
legal order, it has been defined as ‘equity and quasi-equity financing to companies during their
early-growth stages (seed, start-up and expansion phases), including informal investment by
business angels, venture capital and alternative stock markets specialized in SMEs including
high-growth companies (hereafter referred to as investment vehicles)
25. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication
From The Commission ‘Framework for state aid for research and development and innovation’
SWD (2014) 163 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2014/
swd_2014_0163_en.pdf (last accessed 15 April 2015).
26. Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 EC
[now Articles 107 and 108 TFEU respectively] to certain categories of horizontal State aid OJ
1998 L142/1.
27. After 1998, following the Enabling Regulation, the Commission adopted several regulations
that provide for certain exemptions. In 2006, the Commission adopted the De minimis Regu-
lation, recently replaced by a new regulation. Measures that fulfil the criteria of the De
minimis do not constitute ‘state aid’ and therefore do not need to be notified to the Commission
for approval. See Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ 2006 L 379/5. Commission
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Regulation (EC) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ 2013 L
352/1.
28. Commission Regulations (EC) 68/2001 OJ 2001 L10/20, 70/2001 OJ 2001 L10/33, 2204/2001
OJ 2001 L337/3, and 1628/2006 OJ 2006 L32/29.
29. Se supra nt. 15. For a general account of the GBER see (Nicolaides 2014).
30. The aid must be transparent in the meaning of the GBER. Recital 20 of the GBER states that
‘Transparent aid is aid for which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent
ex ante without a need to undertake a risk assessment’, and Art. 5 lists categories of aid that are
transparent as such (e.g. aid comprised in loans, aid comprised in fiscal measures). Aid granted
under the GBER must be under the thresholds laid down in Art. 6. In this regard, it has been
widely acknowledged that the ceilings have also been substantially raised as compared with
the existing ones, implying that individual aid of larger amounts may be provided without pre-
liminary notification to the Commission. This Regulation exempts only aid that has an incentive
effect (Art. 8 GBER).
31. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/rdi_framework_faq_en.pdf (last accessed
15 April 2015).
32. Para. 12 of the Communication on State aid Modernisation.
33. Defining the relevant market means determining the scope of the competition rules in respect of
restrictive practices and abuses of a dominant position, as well as the scope of the merger regu-
lations. The definition is less relevant in the context of State aid, although the notion of market is
still necessary to understand the distortive potential of the State intervention.
34. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community com-
petition law OJ 1997 C 372/5.
35. ‘Removing Obstacles for the Disabled’, Policy Brief of European Commission – DG Justice
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/document/files/disabled_en.pdf (last accessed
15 April 2015).
36. See the projects listed in the DISCIT 7.1 deliverable, available at http://discit.eu/publications
(last accessed 15 April 2015).
37. Parker, a coordinator of ASTERICS, an EU funded project, explains: ‘What I would call the
“old” AT-market is dominated by isolated applications and devices, each addressing a specific
disability or focusing on a specific ability of the user. This is in principle good, since it means
that each device can be brilliantly optimised in its functionality’. See at: http://ec.europa.eu/
digital-agenda/en/news/adaptive-assistive-technologies-people-disabilities (last accessed 15
April 2015).
38. Several studies on the use of AT at home have shown that one-third are abandoned early and lie
unused (Scherer and Galvin 1996; Kittel et al. 2002; Scherer 2005) because these devices are
not ‘consumer friendly’, and are not easy to use. An investigation conducted in the US has con-
firmed that people with disabilities require ‘improved design for compatibility, durability, and
customizability’ and advocates for ‘consumer input during market research, product design,
and product testing’ (Lenker et al. 2013). Interestingly, the participants in this research study
articulated concerns about product usability, as well as ideas for new product features: ‘Need
a screen that doesn’t wash out in sunlight’; ‘GPS built into chair for location in emergency’
. . . ‘Make cell phone electronics compatible with wheelchair controls’ (Lenker et al. 2013).
39. See at http://www.atis4all.eu/default.aspx (last accessed 15 April 2015).
40. A study conducted in Germany with regards to assistive devices for people with ASL shows
that, outside of other bureaucratic problems, public financing covers only low prices assistive
devices (Henschke 2012).
41. For example, Caccamo and others (2014) observe that, especially in developing (or low income)
countries, normal hearing aids are expensive and consequently out of reach to disadvantaged
populations. The average price of high quality hearing aids ranges between $1000 and
$6000, therefore limiting the availability and access for many even in developed countries
(Caccamo et al. 2014).
42. The iPhone and the android operating system are opposite examples. The same with Windows
and even iOS. All were initially inaccessible and have become more accessible.
43. In this article, innovation is conceived, in line with the Community framework for State aid for
research and development and innovation, OJ 2006 C 323/1, as ‘related to a process connecting
knowledge and technology with the exploitation of market opportunities for new or improved
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products, services and business processes compared to those already available on the common
market, and encompassing a certain degree of risk’. Product innovation is referred to changes to
the products themselves, encompassing the creation of new products or the improvement of
existing products.
44. The valley of death describes the point at which a business has a working prototype for a
product or service that has not yet been developed enough to earn money through commercial
sales (Ford, Koutsky, and Spitwak 2007).
45. Article 114 TFEU confers to EU the power to adopt legislation which has as its object the estab-
lishment and functioning of the internal market. Up to now, Article 114 has provided the legal
basis for a number of instruments (Waddington 2009, 2013). Declaration No. 22 to the Treaty of
Amsterdam stipulates that in drawing up measures under what is now Article 114, ‘the insti-
tutions of the [EU] shall take account of the needs of persons with a disability.’ The rationale
behind many accessibility-related legislations adopted under Article 114 TFEU is the elimin-
ation of barriers in the Internal market and harmonization of standards of goods and services
offered in the EU (Waddington 2009). As the Court of Justice has consistently held that to
justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU as legal basis what matters is that the measure adopted
on that basis must actually be intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and func-
tioning of the internal market (Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, [2000]
ECR I-8419; Case C-380/03 Germany v. European Parliament and Council, [2006] ECR
I-11573). Certainly, the Treaty intends to confer on the legislature a discretion in selecting
the method of harmonization (minimum or maximum) most appropriate for achieving the
desired result (Weatherill 2011).
46. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_just_025_european_acces-
sibiliy_act_en.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2015).
47. COM (2008) 426. On the proposal see Waddington (2011b).
48. See infra Section 4. See also Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to
Article 107(1) TFEU, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_
aid_notion/draft_guidance_en.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2015).
49. Amongst others, see Veritas project, available http://veritas-project.eu/index.html (last accessed
30 April 2015).
50. Key enabling technologies (KETs) encompass micro-/nanoelectronics, nanotechnology, photo-
nics, advanced materials, industrial biotechnology and advanced manufacturing technologies
(which are relevant in developing accessible technology). Communication from the Commis-
sion ‘A European strategy for Key Enabling Technologies – A bridge to growth and jobs’ of
26 June 2012, COM(2012) 341 final.
51. Commission Communication Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth, of 3 October 2010, COM(2010) 2020 final.
52. Communication from the Commission Europe 2020 – Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, of
6 October 2010, COM(2010) 546 final.
53. Communication from the Commission ‘Taking forward the Strategic Implementation Plan of
the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing’, of 29 February 2012,
COM (2012) 083 final.
54. Communication from the Commission, Proposal for a Decision on the participation of the
Union in the Active and Assisted Living Research and Development Programme jointly under-
taken by several Member States, of 10. July 2013, COM(2013) 500 final. The AAL JP was
created by 20 EU Member States and three associated countries in 2008. The EU decided to
match participating countries’ support with funding from the 7th Framework Programme for
Research and Technological Development (FP7), based on Article 185 TFEU.
55. In this article, we limit ourselves to note that, despite the commitment towards transparency and
inclusiveness adopted by the Commission in its communication ‘A strategic vision for European
Standards’ and in the Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, the capacity of the European standard-
ization process to produce widely accepted and legitimate standards is questioned (Werle and
Iversen 2006). As stated in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, OJ 2012 L 316/12 SSOs ‘are
subject to competition law to the extent that they can be considered to be an undertaking or
an association of undertakings within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU’. With the
Guidelines on the application of former Article 81 EC (now, of course, Article 101 TFEU),
and then in 2011, with their revised version (‘2011 Guidelines’), the Commission provided gui-
dance on standard setting and laid down its general policy toward technological standardization:
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see Communication from the Commission ‘Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements’, OJ
2011 C 11/1. The ‘2011 Guidelines’ set out possible restrictive effects that standard-setting
agreements can give rise to. In addition, they explicitly refer to the creation of barriers to
entry and foreclosure concerns, and to the problem of patent hold-up. Whilst accessibility stan-
dards are more ‘coordinative standards’, it is surprising that the Commission did not refer to
possible restraints to competition in this context.
56. The Framework also details the boundaries of the Commission’s margin of appreciation to
approve R&D aid under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (i.e. aid for important projects of common
European interest). These rules and their application are however out of the scope of this analy-
sis (von Wendland 2012).
57. Para 6 of the 2006 R&D&I Framework.
58. R&D-aid approved under the Framework was granted to different sectors. Several aid measures
favoured microelectronics and to a lesser extent ICT-sector. See: Commission Staff Working
Paper ‘Mid-Term Review of the R&D&I Framework’ of 10 August 2011.
59. Commission Staff Working Paper ‘Mid-Term Review of the R&D&I Framework’ of 10 August
2011.
60. State aid No N 114/2008 – Germany ‘Guidelines on the granting of aid for research, innovation
and technology of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia’ OJ 2008 C 256.
61. State aid N 193/2008 – Spain – Aid scheme supporting the realisation of projects of techno-
logical development and innovation in the Basque region (programme INNOTEK) OJ 2008
C/253.
62. State aid N 188/2008 – Spain Spanish national Research, development and innovation scheme
OJ 2008 C/238.
63. State aid: Commission approves E400 million aid to STMicroelectronics for the Nano2017
research programme, Press release IP/14/733 of 25 June 2014.
64. State aid N 406/2009 – Germany (Free State of Bavaria) – Risk Capital Scheme´ Clusterfonds
Seed GmbH & Co. KG OJ 2010 C158. See also the letter of the Commission of 12.05.2010,
K(2010)2979 final.
65. Aid measure N 756/2007 – Spain – Risk capital measure INVERTEC 2009- 2011 OJ 2009
C108.
66. State aid SA.32520 (2011/N) – Germany Risk Capital Scheme´ High-Tech Gru¨nderfonds II, OJ
2012 C70.
67. See http://www.en.high-tech-gruenderfonds.de/2014/03/fresh-capital-for-desino/ (last accessed
30 April 2015).
68. See at http://www.finsmes.com/2013/08/exelonix-raised-funding-high-tech-gruenderfonds.
html (last accessed 30 April 2015).
69. State aid N 263/2007 – Germany (Saxony) – Saxon Early Stage Fund (Technology Founder
Fund Saxony) OJ 2008 C93.
70. Recital 20 of the GBER stated that ‘Transparent aid is aid for which it is possible to calculate
precisely the gross grant equivalent ex ante without a need to undertake a risk assessment’, and
Article 5 lists categories of aid which are transparent as such (e.g. aid comprised in loans, aid
comprised in fiscal measures).
71. In the case of investment funds targeting exclusively SMEs located in assisted areas, at least
30% of the funding was to be provided by private investors.
72. Article 31(4) GBER.
73. SA.32588 Obero¨sterreichischer Hightechfonds OJ 2011 C110.
74. X77/2010 Fondo Nazionale per l’Innovazione - Capitale di rischio OJ 2010 C75.
75. SA.36232 Fo¨rderprogramm "Hochtechnologien fu¨r das 21. Jahrhundert OJ 2013 C 213.
76. See http://www.forschungsstiftung.de/index.php/Antragstellung/Foerderrichtlinien.html (last
accessed 30 April 2015).
77. The scope of measures that no longer need to be notified to the Commission for prior approval
has been widened under the new GBER.
78. State aid: Commission adopts new rules facilitating public support for research, development
and innovation; European Commission – IP/14/586 of 21 May 2014.
79. See: Answer of industriAll Europe to the consultation by the Commission on State Aid for
Research, Development & Innovation (R&D&I), available http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
consultations/2013_state_aid_rdi/index_en.html (last accessed 15 April 2015)
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80. Article 3(3) TEU.
81. In compliance with Art. 44 UNCRPD, the final decision on the conclusion of the Convention
contains a Declaration of competence, specifying which areas of the agreement fall within
the competence of the EU and which fall within that of its Member States, or are of shared com-
petence between them.
82. Among the new categories there are also: aid schemes to make good the damage caused by
natural disasters, social aid for transport residents of remote regions, aid for broadband infra-
structure, aid for culture and heritage conservation, including aid schemes for audio-visual
works, aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, investment aid for local
infrastructure.
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